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ABSTRACT
We discuss which systemic functions can be implemented in regional 
innovation systems by using public private partnerships (PPP) as a 
vehicle of governance in innovation policy. We analyze PPPs in the 
field of regional innovation policy in which Swedish municipalities and 
regional authorities have been involved. We find that such PPPs are able 
to address knowledge related systemic goals of regional innovation 
policy more comprehensively than entrepreneurial goals; that PPPs tend 
to address the quantitative dimensions of systemic goals of regional 
innovation policy better than qualitative dimensions; and that there is 
considerable variation how PPPs address innovation-related goals across 
types of regions and industries involved.
Keywords: public-private partnerships, regional innovation systems, systemic 
instrument of regional innovation policy, regional governance
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1 Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have appeared as an “emerging (and 
preferred) instrument” of governance in regional innovation policy, 
particularly in research and development policies and in cluster policies 
(Karlsson, 2008; OECD, 2011), with a focus on building and strengthening 
interfaces between the actors of a regional innovation system (Cooke & 
Morgan, 1994; Fogelberg & Thorpenberg, 2012; Hagedoorn, Link, & Vonortas, 
2000; OECD, 2004, 2010, 2011). From a systemic perspective, the increased 
heterogeneity of innovation processes has, on the one hand, intensified 
networking and interactive learning as necessary provisions for promoting 
and diffusing innovation within a region (Asheim, Smith & Oughton, 2011; 
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Lundvall, 1992; OECD, 2011), but on the other hand, it has significantly elevated 
coordination needs and the risk of systemic failure (Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004; 
Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012). 
While most studies of regional innovation systems (RIS) focus on dynamics 
and innovation performance of RIS agents to provide inputs for innovation 
policy, our study addresses a key governance issue by analyzing established 
cooperative practices between public and private sector actors from a 
systemic perspective. The merge of structural facets that “produce, distribute 
and apply various kinds of knowledge” significantly facilitates knowledge 
generation (Wolfe, 1999, p. 130) and PPPs by its very nature are capable of 
acting as a systemic policy instrument to enhance interface management, 
strengthen cross-sectoral linkages and stimulate demand for goods based on 
specific technologies. Therefore, the concept of PPP – on which this paper 
is based – is defined in terms of synergetic relations between innovation 
agents, and is expressed in a co-operative institutional arrangement (Hodge 
& Greve, 2007).
We hypothesize that PPP is a suitable policy instrument to address 
systemic goals of regional innovation policy (RIP) and stimulate knowledge-
development and entrepreneurial activities within an RIS. Our analysis of six 
RIP-related PPPs in Sweden largely confirms these hypotheses. The paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework; Section 
3 presents the research design and gives an overview of the empirical basis. 
Systemic goals addressed by PPPs are highlighted in Sections 4 (with regard to 
knowledge-related activities) and 5 (with regard to entrepreneurial activities). 
Section 6 provides conclusions. 
2 The Conceptual Framework
2.1 Systemic Problems in Regional Innovation Systems
A regional innovation system (RIS) can be defined as an “institutional 
infrastructure supporting innovation within the productive structure of a 
region” (Asheim & Coenen, 2005) that comprises the knowledge application 
and exploitation sub-systems (regional production structure) and the 
knowledge generation and diffusion sub-systems (regional supportive 
infrastructure) (Cooke, 2002). Schumpeterian “new combinations” or cross-
fertilization of existing factors are generated by a multifaceted set of 
structures in a different way (Lundvall, 1992), and innovation is considered 
an endogenous process comprising multiple learning processes embedded 
in regular economic activities (Edquist, 1997). The RIS approach emphasizes 
actors’ interdependence in the process of knowledge production, the 
institutional context that facilitates interaction and collective learning, and 
the position that tacit and “sticky” knowledge is best “traded” in a shared social 
milieu (Asheim & Coenen, 2005; Edquist, 1997; Gertler, 2003; Isaksen, 2001). 
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The systemic dimension of RIS derives from synergetic effects generated in the 
interaction among economic demand, political objectives, and technological 
opportunities (Leydesdorff & Zawdie, 2010), and the performance of an RIS 
therefore depends on the appropriate institutional milieu and the dynamics 
of actors’ interactions. The increased importance of nonmarket coordination 
due to the systemic nature of innovation, and the integration of national 
and global markets into more complex systems has awakened interest for 
innovation policy instruments which are capable of handling interfaces and 
addressing enhanced coordination needs (Galli & Teubal, 2002). 
Conceptual requirements of policy tools for dealing with systemic failures 
have been developed by Smits & Kuhlmann (2004) and Wieczorek & Hekkert 
(2012); the latter distinguish four systemic problems of the innovation 
process: 
1. actors’ problems are related to the (non-) presence of key actors 
(companies, knowledge organizations, government and others like 
financial organizations) and the (non-) availability of appropriate 
competences to face technological changes;
2. interaction/network problems are related to technological lock-
ins hampering the development of new technologies, to the lack 
of complementary capabilities between agents, and to the level of 
interaction intensity (which might be too weak or too strong);
3. institutional problems are linked to “common sets of habits, routines, 
established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and 
interactions between individuals, groups and organisations” (Edquist & 
Johnson, 1997) which might be inadequate for supporting innovation;
4. infrastructural problems are related to the availability and quality of 
physical infrastructure (including networks), knowledge/scientific 
infrastructure, and financial infrastructure.
Addressing these systemic problems requires policy instruments that 
potentially focus on the innovation system as a whole, supporting thereby 
crucial elements in the governance of innovation processes. Therefore 
systemic instruments are specific interventions that ought to target relevant 
system imperfections and failures, namely (Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012):
1. the presence of actors’ problems is addressed through the goal 
to “Stimulate and organize the participation of relevant actors” 
(henceforth: systemic goal A), and the capabilities’ dimension of actors’ 
problems through the goal to “Create space for actors’ capabilities 
development” (goal B);
2. the presence of interaction problems is addressed through the goal 
to “Stimulate occurrence of interaction among heterogeneous actors” 
(goal C), and the capacity aspect of interaction problems through the 
goal to “Prevent ties that are either too strong or too weak” (goal D);
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3. the presence of institutional problems is addressed through the goal 
to “Secure presence of hard and soft institutions” (goal E), the intensity 
dimension of institutional problems through the goal to “Prevent 
institutions being too weak or too stringent” (goal F);
4. the presence of infrastructural problems is addressed through the 
goal to “Stimulate physical, financial and knowledge infrastructure” 
(goal G), and the quality aspect of infrastructural problems through the 
goal to “Ensure adequate quality of infrastructure” (goal H).
Hence each category of systemic innovation problems comprises a 
quantitative dimension (presence of the problem) and a qualitative 
dimension (quality/intensity of the problem). In addition, each category also 
comprises an entrepreneurial dimension and a knowledge-related dimension 
for stimulating innovation1. For allowing technological innovation activity to 
unfold its potential, simultaneous changes should take place across sectors 
and organizations calling for dynamic interaction between various actors of 
the innovation process.
2.2 Systemic Innovation Problems and PPP
In a systemic view of innovation, PPPs’ primary role is to build cooperation 
among agents involved in the innovation process and to build and strengthen 
the relationships between the public and private sectors. A PPP is
“an agreement between the government and one or more private partners 
(which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the 
private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery 
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private 
partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient 
transfer of risk to the private partners” (OECD, 2008).
While many studies of PPP emphasize macroeconomic or microeconomic 
motivations for applying PPPs in public infrastructure development (e.g. 
Mrak, 2006; McQuaid & Scherrer, 2008; Švigelj & Hrovatin, 2013) in the case of 
innovation-policy delivery, PPPs are specifically motivated by their capacity to 
coordinate public and private actors (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010; Kristensen, 
McQuaid, & Scherrer, 2016). Consequently, by their very nature PPPs enable 
policy makers to address systemic goals of innovation policy and to correct 
for systemic failures. PPP as a mode of governance then serves as a systemic 
instrument of innovation policy connecting public and private agents in a way 
which allows them to search for new combinations of factors of production, 
share risks and, finally, deliver a new product or service.2 As the underlying 
rationale for collaboration in knowledge-related activities rests mainly on 
exploiting diverse knowledge, PPPs potentially encourage non-profit and 
1 Therefore subscript k will be used for knowledge-related systemic goals and subscript e for 
entrepreneurial systemic goals.
2 This paper has its focus on technological innovation and on related services which are 
delivered in collaboration between public and private partners.
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for-profit innovation agents to interact in a synergistic way (Edquist, 1997; 
Nelson & Winter, 1977).
Therefore, we hypothesize (H1) that PPPs are able to ensure the presence of 
relevant structural elements needed for knowledge-related activities within 
RIS by creating platforms for knowledge and competence exchange; and (H2) 
that PPPs are able to address the quality of structural properties relevant for 
knowledge-related activities within RIS by creating and stimulating interactive 
continuous learning among system elements.
The knowledge development activities, constitute, however, just one 
dimension of RIS, as knowledge ought to be translated into revenue-
creating commercial activities in order for innovation to happen. In a 
systemic perspective of innovation not all aspects of knowledge generation 
and diffusion can be explained with the “isolated profit-maximizing firm” 
(Edquist, 1997) since the behavior and interaction of many RIS elements are 
governed by non-market forces (Edquist, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1977). The 
capabilities and resources required for dealing with “the interconnected 
issues raised in many policy areas” (McQuaid, 2000) reside only partially within 
any given innovation agent. From a systemic perspective, entrepreneurs 
are seen as social agents that learn by interacting and develop their 
entrepreneurial identities only within an appropriate supporting system 
because interdependence shapes and limits the innovative capabilities and 
competitive dynamics of local companies. Hence, innovation actors should 
seek collaboration with partners that have a competitive advantage in 
particular aspects of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Collaboration is best 
achieved in the context of shared accountability and commitment where all 
partners have an opportunity to influence the shared objectives, outcomes, 
evaluations and decision-making processes (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). 
However, cooperation among local agents and the entrepreneurial climate 
largely depend on the policy environment and the historical evolution of the 
regional institutional framework. Forming partnerships between public and 
private actors in RIS might help create a greater impact on policy choices and 
expand public support, increasing the legitimacy of actions and involving 
agencies with a more narrow range of objectives (McQuaid, 2000), thus 
allowing more targeted policy interventions (Silva & Rodriguez, 2005).
Therefore we hypothesize (H3) that PPPs are able to ensure the presence of 
relevant structural elements needed for entrepreneurial activities within RIS; 
and (H4) that PPPs are able to contribute to the entrepreneurial capacity of 
RIS by increasing the socio-institutional and innovative potential of public and 
(particularly) private actors involved in collaboration.
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3 Research Design
In order to empirically test the hypotheses H1 to H4 we adapt the systemic 
innovation policy framework of Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012) to six PPP cases 
which have been established in Sweden in the field of RIP3. Hypotheses will be 
considered confirmed if empirical results are supportive for all relevant goals 
in all six cases of PPP and will be considered rejected if empirical results are 
supportive only in two or fewer goals within a dimension (across all cases), 
and/or in three or fewer cases (across all goals within a dimension). Otherwise 
empirical results are considered only partially supportive.
Sweden was selected because of its long corporatist tradition in which public 
and private agents are expected to engage in cooperation for “the mutual 
benefit of social development” and because PPP as the “mutual development 
model in Sweden still worked” (Fogelberg & Thorpenberg, 2012, p. 354). 
Empirical evidence suggests that PPPs are a common instrument in Sweden’s 
RIP (Kristensen, McQuaid, & Scherrer, 2016) rooted in strong local self-
governance which enables local policy makers to exert a significant degree 
of autonomy in undertaking policy initiatives with the involvement of private 
partners (Weihe et al., 2011). Local policy makers enjoy considerable fiscal 
autonomy as the taxes on the local level account for two-thirds of Swedish 
local authorities’ revenues and therefore provide a sound financial basis for a 
custom-tailored RIP (SCB, 2012).
For empirical analysis six PPPs from Övre Norrland (SE 33) and Sydsverige 
(SE 22) in the life science, ICT and automotive industries were selected. In 
order to capture regional and industry-specific variations, the case study 
selection criteria were based on innovative performance of the region4, the 
role of key knowledge-intensive industries for economic diversification of the 
region, and the co-initiation structure used for establishing the PPPs5. Semi-
structured interviews with major stakeholders of the PPPs constitute the 
major source of data; additional input was obtained through secondary data 
analysis covering evaluation reports, policy documents, legislation and other 
written material.
Interviews were conducted with six representatives from private companies 
(mainly chief-executive officers) and ten from the public sector including 
university researchers and representatives from national and regional 
governmental agencies. Interviews were based on open-ended and follow-
up questions, enabling respondents to provide in-depth information on their 
experiences in public-private cooperation. Interview transcripts were coded 
according to categories and sub-categories identified in the course of data 
3 For detailed information about the six cases see Appendix 1.
4 According to the European Regional Innovation Scoreboard (EU, 2014) Sydsverige (SE22, 
the South of Sweden) is an “innovation leader” region while Övre Norrland is an “innovation 
follower”.
5 PPPs can be (co-) initiated by policy makers at the municipal and/or regional and/or national 
levels.
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processing (Saldaña, 2009), which are used as “proxies” for indicating if a PPP 
is considered to address the respective systemic goal (see Table 1).
Table 1: Definition of Proxy “Indicators”
RIS 
dimension
Systemic Goals 
k: knowledge-related; 
e: entrepreneurial 
Proxies 
k: knowledge-related; 
e: entrepreneurial
Presence 
Ak, Ae “Stimulate and organise 
the participation of relevant 
actors”
Learning-oriented meetings (for goal Ak)
Existence of strategy-oriented meetings (for goal Ae)
Ck, Ce “Stimulate occurrence 
of interaction among 
heterogeneous actors”
Frequency of formal & informal interactions (for goal Ck)
Consensus building efficiency (for goal Ce)
Ek, Ee “Secure presence of hard 
and soft institutions”
Presence of an adequate institutional framework 
(for goal Ek)
Lobbying power (for goal Ee)
Gk, Ge “Stimulate physical, 
financial and knowledge 
infrastructure”
Availability of research infrastructure (for goal Gk)
Availability of local financial support, physical 
infrastructure and local commuting systems (for goal Ge)
Quality Bk, Be “Create space for actors’ capabilities development”
Partners’ learning outcomes (for goal Bk)
Approaches to strategic planning (for goal Be)
Dk, De “Prevent ties that are 
either too strong or too weak”
Power structure & the balance of partners’ influence 
(for goal Dk)
Power structure & the balance of partners’ influence 
(for goal De)
Fk, Fe “Prevent institutions being 
too weak or too stringent”
Stringency of the partnership composition (for goal Fk)
General legal frame (for goal Fe)
Hk, He “Ensure adequate quality 
of infrastructure”
Research quality & partners’ contribution to education & 
research (for goal Hk)
PPPs’ impact on regional policy-making (for goal He)
The respondents’ answers could be subject to some bias as they might be 
interested in claiming that “their” respective PPP is successful and thus 
deliver a rather positive view on cooperation. Another challenge of qualitative 
analysis has been the lack of operational and comparable quantitative success 
indicators. For these reasons a cross-check with independent reports of 
selected PPPs and other sources was performed, showing that respondents’ 
answers seem to provide an adequate picture of collaboration.
4 PPP and Knowledge-Related Systemic Functions
PPP’s aim to bring together key public and private actors (goal Ak) to achieve 
a mission that requires competence, knowledge and resources beyond what 
each agent possesses individually. The participation of various public and 
private partners is stimulated and organized through narrow-focused expert 
meetings and more general educational or training meetings.
In addressing systemic goal Bk PPPs aim at developing new skills or techniques 
and act as a catalyst creating a stimulating environment for interaction. They 
facilitate learning by creating new practices and opening up new opportunities 
to enhance the optimization of shared information and data among partners. 
The rationale for undertaking a PPP from a learning perspective varies among 
participating private partners: business activities and innovation strategies 
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in IT PPPs seem to require proactive learning, whereas in the life-science 
industry the preferred learning modes of the private partners are consistent 
with those forms that are easily accommodated within an existing operational 
and innovation model of the respective companies (this can mean simple 
business transactions like renting space or equipment to other companies).
Concerning goal Ck the structures of the six PPPs allow for widening the scope 
of actors’ regular (social) interaction through formal meetings (at least two 
per year) and informal meetings among stakeholders (which are considered 
essential for knowledge exchange).
Systemic goal Dk is approximated by the existence of one or very few 
partners which dominate the PPP’s goal setting and performance. The 
power distribution between partners has implications on the supply of 
complementary knowledge essential for interactive learning and innovation; 
different forms and shifts of power distribution might reduce incentives for 
public and (particularly) private participation. The dominance of the public 
actors’ interest might not affect the intensity of current cooperation but 
might have an impact in the long run.
By providing an institutional framework (goal Ek) in the form of contracts 
and documents (hard institutions) which set up the respective public-private 
cooperation, PPPs in all six cases ensure the presence of a permanent 
cooperation platform for operation and decision-making. Soft institutions 
are promoted by several PPPs by enhancing cohesive social structures and 
developing common norms and trust among partners. Trust is considered 
particularly valuable in situations when the interests and incentives of 
partners are not perfectly aligned because it supports knowledge exchanges 
that would not have been possible otherwise.
The stringency of institutions (goal Fk) is reflected in the rigidity of 
membership structures (rules for partners’ appointment and resignation) and 
the corresponding degree of knowledge-sharing among partners. “Open” 
partnership structures provide flexibility to incorporate “external” expertise 
and skills which are essential for the PPP’s activities, while “rigid” forms 
reduce the risks of coordination failure and information leakage by limiting 
new partners’ appointment. PPPs in life science and automotive industries 
are characterized by relatively weak institutional configurations, while in 
the IT industry rapid changes in technology and frequent new product 
introductions seem to require a partnership structure potentially capable 
of averting information leakage and unwanted competitors’ access to new 
knowledge created within the partnership.
Systemic goal Gk is addressed in all cases by providing research platforms 
for knowledge and competence exchange. The presence of a university is 
perceived to be crucial for achieving this goal.
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The quality of knowledge infrastructure (goal Hk) is influenced by companies’ 
active involvement in education and research with the purpose to stimulate 
the responsiveness of higher education to industry needs. This commitment 
takes various forms like adjunct professorships, guest lecturing, industrial 
internships and PhDs, student projects and supervision etc. Interaction 
between industry and academia is rather intense in all PPPs, and only in one 
case has the intensity of industry-university interaction decreased recently.
5 PPP and Entrepreneurial Systemic Functions
All six PPPs succeed in stimulating and organizing the participation of relevant 
actors (goal Ae) through strategic meetings and market-oriented activities 
like branding support. No specific regional tax incentives have been applied 
to stimulate private partners’ participation in public-private cooperation for 
innovation creation.
By applying a team-based approach to the strategic planning of collaborative 
activities all PPPs provide an opportunity for partners to articulate available 
competences and resources (goal Be). Only one PPP applies a few-player 
approach to strategic planning, in which private companies are not essentially 
involved in the process of vision and strategy development.
With regard to goal Ce the IT-sector PPPs explicitly report that direct 
communication among partners significantly contributes to consensus-
building through balancing interests, which might be attributed to their 
rigid organizational structure. Within the life-science sector PPPs’ public and 
private partners achieve common ground by jointly pursuing long-term goals 
of regional growth and employment generation, while consensus-building 
processes appear to be less well articulated in automotive-industry PPPs. 
Among their members most PPPs enhance the perception of individual and 
collective benefits from knowledge- and competence-sharing among partners 
(which is consistent with goal Be).
Systemic goal De is addressed in the same way as concerning knowledge-
related activities. In one PPP in Sydsverige large private players show some 
dominance, while in one PPP in Övre Norrland regional and local authorities 
dominate.
Concerning goal Ee differences across PPPs exist; they are systematically 
related neither to sectors nor to regions in which the PPPs have been 
established. Nearly all cases report only limited lobbying activity to take place 
through the PPP which suggests that such activities are either carried out 
through other channels (e.g. business and industry associations) or by large 
enterprises which are partners in the PPP but which can act independently.
Addressing systemic goal Fe through PPPs seems to be sector-related. PPPs 
in the ICT sector, again, exhibit rigid membership structures whereas PPPs 
in the life-science and automotive industries have more flexible membership 
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structures. Open PPP membership structures seem to be more important 
concerning entrepreneurial activities than knowledge-related activities.
All PPPs are successful in providing an extent of physical infrastructure (goal 
Ge) which is adequate to manage collaborative activities. The specific financial 
infrastructure in the form of joint research funding is provided in two PPPs, 
while infrastructure of a more general nature like public transport and 
logistics is provided outside the PPPs.
With regard to goal He PPPs in the peripheral region are placed within 
relatively small (though active) regional research environments and 
considered important regional players. They are strongly involved in regional 
economic policy-making, considering this a major channel to ensure the 
provision of adequate infrastructure. PPPs in the larger and higher developed 
Sydsverige play a less important role in regional economic policy making.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The capacity of PPPs to address systemic goals and to act as a mode 
of governance in regional innovation policy was analyzed by applying a 
framework of systemic goals and functions of innovation policy developed 
by Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012) to six cases in Sweden. Four hypotheses on 
the capability of PPPs to provide systemic functions in RIP were developed in 
section 2 and were tested in sections 4 and 56. Table 2 provides an overview 
of results; a ““ indicates that a goal is addressed by the corresponding PPP 
case.
Hypothesis H1 is confirmed: PPPs appear to be important for stimulating the 
participation of multiple stakeholders (goal Ak), the occurrence of interactions 
among them (goal Ck), securing the presence of hard and soft institutions 
(goal Ek), and ensuring the availability of the knowledge infrastructure 
(goal Gk). PPPs therefore generally are capable of addressing the presence 
dimension of knowledge-related systemic functions of an RIS.
Hypothesis H2 is partially supported by empirical evidence: All PPPs aim at 
“direct learning” outcomes and act as a catalyst for creating a stimulating 
environment for interaction (goal Bk) and add to providing high-quality 
knowledge-related infrastructure for innovation (goal Hk). The stringency 
of linkages between public and private stakeholders (goal Fk) varies across 
economic sectors, and a majority of PPPs (though not all) extend partners’ 
capacity to exert influence over the partnership’s operating activities (goal 
Dk).
6 Hypotheses will be considered confirmed if empirical results are supportive for all relevant 
goals in all six cases of PPP and will be considered rejected if empirical results are supportive 
only in two or fewer goals within a dimension (across all cases), and/or in three or fewer cases 
(across all goals within a dimension). Otherwise empirical results are considered only partially 
supportive. See section 3.
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Table 2: Knowledge-Related and Entrepreneurial Goals Addressed by PPP 
Cases – Overview 
Hypothesis Goal
PPP cases
MV BU SoS FL KCFP CASTT
H1 
Goal Ak      
Goal Ck      
Goal Ek      
Goal Gk      
H2 
Goal Bk      
Goal Dk  o   o 
Goal Fk   o o  
Goal Hk      
H3
Goal Ae      
Goal Ce      
Goal Ee  o o o o o 
Goal Ge      
H4
Goal Be  o    
Goal De  o   o 
Goal Fe   o o  
Goal He   o  o 
Hypothesis H3 is confirmed: All PPPs succeed in stimulating and organizing 
the participation of relevant actors (goal Ae) and in providing physical 
infrastructure to a degree, although only partially concerning financial 
infrastructure (goal Ge). Goals Ce and Ee are addressed in all PPPs, too, although 
differences across PPPs exist with regard to the way how these goals are 
addressed. PPPs therefore generally are capable of addressing the presence 
dimension of entrepreneurial systemic functions of an RIS.
Hypothesis H4 is partially supported by empirical evidence: All PPPs provide 
an opportunity for partners to articulate available competences and resources 
(goal Be), and the majority of PPPs extend partners’ capacities to exert 
influence over the partnership’s operating activities (goal De). Concerning 
goal Fe sector-related differences of the stringency of institutions across PPPs 
have been found. The impact on the quality of infrastructure through PPPs 
(goal He) varies across regions; not all aspects of infrastructure are targeted 
by PPPs.
Thus we find that all PPPs are able to ensure the presence of relevant 
structural elements within a RIS with regard to both knowledge-related and 
entrepreneurial activities. The result is less clear concerning quality aspects 
as PPPs’ structural diversity allows for considerable qualitative variations of 
RIS characteristics across regions and industries; therefore, the qualitative 
(capability) dimension’s accomplishments vary across goals, sectors and 
regions. PPPs tend to be gradually more suitable for targeting quality aspects 
of knowledge-related than for targeting entrepreneurial regional innovation 
activity. Particularly in non-profit forms of cooperation, PPPs in the field of 
RIP are primarily focused on knowledge-related activities in order to enhance 
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innovation processes. Entrepreneurial activities are also present since joint 
generation of innovative ideas offers attractive business incentives for 
private stakeholders by facilitating commercial embracing and exploitation 
of emerging innovation.
Differences along the knowledge-related dimension of systemic goals of RIP 
appear to be industry-specific. The learning rationale and the strength of 
relationships between participating actors differ across sectors: in life science 
PPPs’ learning practices appear to be easily adaptable to existing operational 
and innovation patterns of partners; in ICT-based PPPs more effort is devoted 
to workforce up-skilling than PPPs in the other sectors. Differences along 
the entrepreneurial dimension of systemic goals of RIP appear to be largely 
region-specific. The institutional framework seems to be rather context-
dependent, and the levels of regional policy-coordination efficiency might 
vary across (types of) regions. The economic diversification in large and highly 
developed Sydsverige intensifies redistributive conflicts among a multitude 
of actors, while in peripheral Övre Norrland’s RIP only a smaller number of 
actors is present, and PPPs therefore tend to exert more influence in regional 
policy-making.
Our empirical analysis relates to industries with analytical and synthetic 
knowledge bases (Asheim & Coenen, 2005), and to regions that are part 
of a nation which is among Europe’s innovation leaders. Further research, 
therefore, should be extended to more varieties of regional contexts and 
industries in order to capture an even broader spectrum of PPP-use in RIP. As 
proximity issues are a key element for understanding the innovation process 
(Boschma, 2005) future research should also focus on operationalizing 
proximity linkages within the PPP context. Last but not least research on 
the use of PPPs as a systemic instrument of regional innovation policy would 
benefit from solving the issue of performance measurement of PPPs in 
order to allow comparing the effectiveness and efficiency of PPP with other 
instruments of regional innovation policy.
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Appendix 1: Description of Cases
Region Case Description
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MV is a Danish-Swedish biotech cluster, specializing in five therapeutic areas i.e. diabetes/
metabolism, neuroscience, cancer, inflammation and allergy, comprises the capital city, 
Copenhagen, and the Själland region on the Danish side, and Skåne region on the Swedish 
side (the cross-border Öresund region). MV has currently 250 paying members including 
universities, hospitals, regional governments and life science companies (including the 
major pharmaceutical companies in the region i.e. Novo Nordisk, Lundbeck and Astra-
Zeneca) representing the triple helix structure in the region. At the cluster organization 
level, public-private cooperation is well established implying that financial and performance 
consequences of a risk are distributed among public and private partners; however, as there 
are complex interactions with both local and international research groups, knowledge 
networks in life science industry (particularly of major companies) the risk distribution as well 
as the degree of financial and performance risk will vary across projects. 
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SoS was launched in 2008 at Lund University by the Swedish Innovation Agency (Vinnova) as 
a 10 year project, operating under the umbrella program called ‘Industry Excellence Center 
Program’, to contribute to the development of novel system solutions on silicon for wireless 
communication devices (Vinnova 2010). SoS builds up on a long-term commitment and 
research interest from one of the major ICT players i.e. Ericsson. The main mission of the 
established Center is to strengthen collaborative links between industry and university with 
the intention of upgrading knowledge and competence necessary to carry out high-quality 
and industry-relevant research. These favourable framework conditions have offered a 
platform for an open dialogue between partners, bringing basic research closer to industrial 
needs and thereby reducing the risk of project failure i.e. performance risk is shared between 
public and private partners (Vinnova 2010). However, a certain financial risk is still present 
if one of the multinational enterprises decides to withdraw from the partnership, putting a 
financial restraint on research activities for both public and private partners.
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KCFP started in 1995 under the national umbrella program called the ‘Swedish Competence 
Centers Program’ with the purpose to build a better understanding of the combustion 
process in internal combustion engines. Strong connections with Sweden’s automotive, 
stationary power and heavy vehicle industry that go back to the big restart of combustion 
activities in Lund in the beginning of the 1990s (prior to the establishment of KCFP), laid 
the basis for the center’s cross-disciplinary interaction between various public and private 
partners (Baras et al. 2003). The scope of the Center’s operation has created an enabling 
environment also for the participation of SMEs (Swedish Energy Agency 2009) that may serve 
as potential suppliers to large companies (e.g. valve technology promoted by the Center to 
engine OEMs). Partners are exposed to a low risk of not reaching the full research potential 
as well as to some level of financial risk as funding come in equal shares from public and 
private stakeholders.
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BU is a life-science cluster in the north of Sweden that is currently functioning under the 
umbrella of Uminova Innovation – Business Incubator and Technology Transfer Office - to 
support growth of the biotech and medical technology industry in the region particularly in 
the areas of infectious disease research, plant and forest biotechnology, the nervous system, 
metabolic diseases, medical technology and diagnostics. As an emerging cluster, BU lacks a 
broad industrial base, and its potential for collaboration with partners from outside is limited; 
therefore its activities are primarily directed towards creating spin-offs rather than strategic 
research and product development (European Commission 2011). However, at the individual 
level, cluster stakeholders (companies and universities) are quite externally-oriented and 
open for R&D activities and business partnerships with partners outside the cluster where 
financial and performance risks are shared between public and private partners.
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In 2007 the FL started at Luleå University of Technology under the national ‘VINN Excellence 
Center Program’ aiming to enhance the interaction between research and industry towards 
producing tangible economic benefits and innovation. Collaborative efforts of a PPP are 
directed at the alignment of research agenda with shared industrial needs of private partners 
with the purpose of contributing to sustainable economic growth (Vinnova 2009). Some 
of the private partners e.g.  Loussavaara-Kiirunavaara AB (LKAB) have long-standing links 
with the Luleå University of Technology providing a solid foundation of mutual trust and 
understanding that the current Center can build upon (ibid). ). However, failure to meet 
the planned performance level according to the submitted program, which in turn may 
jeopardize future cash flow (every second year VINNOVA evaluates work and research 
progress and makes decision whether or not to grant funding for another year) exposes 
partners to a certain degree of shared financial and performance risk.
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CASTT was founded by Luleå University of Technology in 2005 with the purpose to support 
the automotive industry in the north of Sweden. The initiative came from the national 
government, yet not as a formal request but more like guidance in the form of a ‘press 
release’ stating that the government will allot a certain amount of money for the university 
with the purpose to support winter test automotive area in the north of Sweden. However, 
funding is currently only limited to ERDF and to financial contributions from VINNOVA. 
Private partners include automotive testing companies, which are predominantly SMEs 
(the largest one has a turnover of about 40 million euro), organized in the Swedish Proving 
Ground Association (SPGA), automobile and component manufacturers; public partners 
include the county, municipalities and Luleå University of Technology. Private partners bear 
relatively low financial risk and comparatively high performance risk as regards hurting their 
business reputation on the market if they are not able to deliver the agreed service. Public 
partners are predominantly exposed to financial risk due to its strong dependence on public 
funding whereas performance risk is significantly lower and is mainly related to supervisory 
reporting (in order to raise funding for future activities).
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POVZETEK
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Javno-zasebno partnerstvo kot sistemski instrument 
upravljanja v regionalni inovacijski politiki
V tem članku proučujemo, ali lahko javno-zasebno partnerstvo (JZP) deluje 
kot sistemski instrument regionalne inovacijske politike (RIP). JZP se je pojavil 
kot vse bolj znan in upoštevan instrument upravljanja v regionalni inovacijski 
politiki, še posebej pri raziskovanju in razvoju politik ter pri politikah grozdov. 
Potrebe po sodelovanju in tveganje sistemske napake so se povečevali 
zaradi vse večje heterogenosti inovacijskih procesov in agentov. Za JZP 
je značilno, da se osredotoča na graditev in krepitev povezav med akterji 
regionalnega inovacijskega sistema (RIS). Koncept JZP se v članku razume kot 
izraz sinergijske povezave med inovacijskimi agenti, izražene v sporazumu o 
sodelovanju institucij.
Študija analizira vzpostavljene kooperativne prakse med akterji javnega in 
zasebnega sektorja s sistemskega vidika v okviru štirih sistemskih problemov 
inovacijskega procesa. V skladu z literaturo razlikujemo: probleme akterjev, 
povezane z (ne)navzočnostjo ključnih akterjev in (ne)dostopnostjo ustreznih 
kompetenc za soočanje s tehnološkimi spremembami; interakcijske ali 
omrežne probleme, povezane s tehnološko zaostalostjo, ki ovira razvoj novih 
tehnologij, s pomanjkanjem komplementarnih zmogljivosti med agenti in 
ravnijo intenzivnosti interakcij; institucionalne probleme, povezane z množico 
splošnih navad, rutin, vzpostavljenih praks, pravil ali zakonov, ki ne utegnejo 
ustrezno podpirati inoviranja, ter infrastrukturne probleme, povezane z 
dostopnostjo in s kakovostjo fizične, izobraževalne in finančne infrastrukture. 
Vsak od naštetih sistemskih problemov ima tako kvantitativno kot kvalitativno 
dimenzijo. Poleg tega obsega vsak sistemski problem tudi podjetniško 
dimenzijo in z znanjem povezano dimenzijo za spodbujanje inoviranja. Če 
naj instrument inovacijske politike velja kot “sistemski” in sposoben izvajati 
sistemsko funkcijo, pa mora uspešno reševati vsaj enega od teh sistemskih 
problemov.
V članku poteka razprava o tem, katere sistemske funkcije se lahko uvajajo 
v regionalnih inovacijskih sistemih z uporabo JZP-ja kot gonila upravljanja 
v inovacijski politiki. Analiziramo šest primerov JZP-ja na področju RIP-a, v 
katerih so bile udeležene švedske občine in regionalne oblasti. Primeri se 
nanašajo tako na centralna kot periferna območja države, izhajajo iz treh 
industrijskih panog (avtomobilska industrija, informacijska tehnologija, 
bioznanost) z različnimi bazami znanja. Domnevamo, da je JZP primeren 
politični instrument za doseganje sistemskih ciljev RIP-a ter spodbujanje 
razvoja znanja in podjetniških aktivnosti znotraj RIS-a.
Analiza večinoma potrjuje naše hipoteze. Ugotavljamo, da lahko vsi primeri 
JZP-ja zagotovijo prisotnost relevantnih strukturnih elementov v RIS-u, 
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tako aktivnosti, povezane z znanjem, kot podjetniške aktivnosti. Rezultat je 
manj jasen pri vidikih kakovosti, kajti strukturna raznolikost JZP-jev dopušča 
precejšnje kakovostne razlike značilnosti RIS-a v različnih regijah in industrijskih 
panogah. Pri JZP-jih se postopno pokaže, da so bolj primerni za lotevanje 
vidikov kakovosti sistemskih funkcij, povezanih z znanjem, kot za podjetniške 
funkcije regionalne inovacijske aktivnosti. Videti je, da so razlike pri dimenziji 
sistemskih ciljev RIP-a, povezanih z znanjem, specifične glede na industrijsko 
panogo. Logika učenja in čvrstost odnosov med sodelujočimi akterji se 
razlikujeta po sektorjih: v panogi bioznanosti se učenje zlahka prilagaja 
obstoječim operativnim in inovacijskim vzorcem partnerjev; v JZP-jih v panogi 
informacijske tehnologije pa je usposabljanju delovne sile namenjenih več 
prizadevanj kot v JZP-jih v drugih sektorjih. Razlike pri podjetniški dimenziji 
sistemskih ciljev RIP-a so pretežno odvisne od regije. Institucionalni okvir 
je bolj odvisen od konteksta, medtem ko se raven učinkovitosti regionalne 
politične koordinacije razlikuje glede na tip regije. Ekonomska diverzifikacija na 
velikih in visoko razvitih centralnih območjih povečuje intenzivnost konfliktov 
redistribucije med množico akterjev, medtem ko je v regionalni inovacijski 
politiki perifernih območij navzoče zgolj majhno število akterjev, zato imajo 
JZP-ji večji vpliv pri oblikovanju regionalne politike.
